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Abstract 
 
The paper extends Breggren et al. (2008, EE) on ‘trust and growth: a shaky relationship” 
by incorporating recent developments in the trust-growth literature and using a robust 
methodological underpinning that accounts for the presence of outliers. The empirical evidence is 
based on 63 countries. Two main findings are established. Firstly, the substantially documented 
positive trust-growth nexus is broadly confirmed. Secondly, when initial levels of growth come 
into play in determining the relationship, only 0.25 and 0.90 quantiles confirm the positive nexus. 
The results suggest that the trust-growth nexus cannot be generalized for all countries as some 
previous studies have concluded. Accordingly, blanket trust-growth policies may not succeed 
unless they are contingent on existing levels of development and tailored differently across rich 
and poor countries.  
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1. Introduction  
 Over the past decades, a substantial body of work has covered the nexus between trust 
and economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Glaeser et al., 2000; Zak & 
Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Breggren et al., 2008; Cahuc, 2013). Accordingly, most 
studies that have investigated the nexus have established a positive trust-growth nexus. The 
debate has recently shifted from the sign of the nexus to the robustness of the nexus (Beugelsdijk 
et al., 2004; Breggren et al., 2008). While Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) have concluded that the 
relationship between trust and economic growth in terms of statistical significance is reasonably 
robust in terms of size of the estimated effect, Breggren et al. (2008) have examined the 
conclusions of previous literature by taking the robustness further and investigating the stability 
of previous findings and exposing them to systematic empirical scrutiny. Whereas Breggren et al. 
(2008) have concluded on a robust and shaky nexus, the conclusions of recent literature provide a 
motivating background for the assessment of a robust and conditional relationship.  
 The emergence of a recent strand of interesting threshold literature on the trust-growth 
nexus has focused on how initial trust levels matter in the trust-growth relationship (Uslaner, 
2008; Tabellini, 2008; Roth, 2009; Algan & Cahuc, 2010). Uslaner (2008) has concluded that 
generalized trust is stable value that is transmitted from parents to children by assessing how 
ethnic background matters in the relationship. Tabellini (2008) in explaining the range of 
situations in which individuals cooperate has studied a theoretical model where individuals 
respond to incentives but are also influenced by norms of good conduct inherited from earlier 
generations. Accordingly, there is an underlying assumption that parents rationally choose what 
values to transmit to their offspring and this choice is influenced by the quality of external 
enforcement and the pattern of likely future transactions. In the same vein, Algan & Cahuc 
(2010) have recently developed a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic 
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growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and time variation. They show that 
inherited trust of descendants is influenced by country of origin and the timing of arrival of their 
forebears: a strategy that allows them to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on 
worldwide growth during the twentieth century. Deviating from ‘inherited initial levels of trust, 
Roth (2009) has also concluded that from a policy point of view, an increase in trust is crucial for 
countries with low levels of trust, but can likely be neglected by countries with sufficient levels 
of trust and may even hamper economic performance in countries with high levels of trust.  
 This paper contributes to existing literature along two main axes: complementing existing 
literature and extending Berggren et al. (2008). Firstly, it complements recent literature in a 
twofold manner by: focusing on ‘growth thresholds’ instead of ‘trust thresholds’ and; 
investigating the Roth (2009) hypothesis: “The common knowledge which has governed the 
nature of discussions in social science and economics of the last ten years, that trust is generally 
positively related to economic performance, must be seriously questioned” (p. 1). Accordingly, 
the use of the quantile regression estimation technique enables us to assess how growth 
thresholds matter in the Roth hypothesis. Secondly, we extend Berggren et al. (2008) by using a 
methodology that is robust in the presence of outliers. The extension of Berggren et al. (2008) has 
a twofold motivation. (1) By using quantile regression, we are able to assess the robustness of the 
findings from another methodology underpinning. Hence, we also complement a strand of the 
literature on the relevance of a robust trust-growth nexus. (2) While the trust-growth relationship 
may be shaky, establishing how it is conditioned on initial growth levels could have substantial 
policy implications. Hence, if the trust-growth nexus is heterogeneous across growth distributions 
then, blanket policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial growth levels and 
tailored differently across high-growth and low-growth countries.  
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 As far as we have reviewed, the only study closest to the present paper in the literature in 
terms of methodological underpinning is Peiró-Palomino & Tortosa-Ausina (2012). The present 
paper steers clear of theirs from three standpoints. Firstly, while they employ the quantile 
regression technique, their scope and positioning is on short-run and long-run development 
outcomes. Secondly, their study does not control for the plethora of cultural and social 
unobserved heterogeneity recently documented in the trust-growth literature (Uslaner, 2008; 
Tabellini, 2008; Algan & Cahuc 2010). Thirdly, the dataset used is significantly different from 
the Berggren et al. (2008) dataset which we intend to use.  
 Consistent with Peiró-Palomino & Tortosa-Ausina (2012) on the motivation for 
employing quantile regression, another aspect on which no consensus has yet been reached 
relates to determining if social capital effects are stronger in poorer or richer countries. Previous 
findings on the concern are based on average effects, mainly from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
which suffers from several limitations. On the one hand in big samples outlying observations are 
common. Hence, estimated coefficients heavily affected by outliers may be biased.  On the other 
hand, when the outliers are controlled for, the trust-growth nexus could depend on initial levels of 
growth. This argument which has become a challenging issue in social capital studies highlighted 
by Knack & Keefer (1997) has been integrated in recent studies (Roth, 2009)
1
.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Measurement and methodology issues are 
discussed in Section 2. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. We conclude with Section 4.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Knack & Keefer (1997) included a regression term ‘trust × initial income’ and concluded that the trust-growth 
nexus was stronger in poorer countries because the estimated value of the term was negative. Roth (2009) has split 
the sample into two sub-samples on the 25 (poorest) and 75 (richest) percentiles.  
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2. Data and Methodology  
2.1 Data  
 We examine a sample of 63 countries using the same dataset as in Berggren et al. (2008) 
because; the problem statement is an extension of Berggren et al. (2008). Hence, using the same 
dataset is logical, since this paper steers clear of the Berggren study in terms of methodological 
underpinnings. The large dataset for the period 1990-2000 also source from Inglehart et al. 
(2000), Inglehart et al. (2004) and Latinobarómetro (2004). Consistent with our methodological 
motivation, we focus on the large sample of Berggren et al. (2008) and not on the small sample 
because issues of outliers (our estimation technique intends to handle) are common with heavier 
samples. We divide the variables into four groups as in the seminal paper motivating this study. 
These include: the dependent variable, the variable of interest and, the fixed and switching 
control variables. While the fixed variables are control variables that are included in all 
regressions, the switch variables are included and varied across specifications. The latter set of 
variables is principally used to control for the unobserved heterogeneity.  
 The dependent variable is the annual growth of real GDP chain per capita (Growth). The 
independent variable of interest is Trust. Fixed variables include: Schooling (the average number 
of years in school, 1990), Investment-good price (the price level of investment), Openness 
(Exports plus imports divided by real GDP per capita, in current prices 1990) and Real GDP per 
capita, in thousands of USD, 1990. Switch variables are twelve that are used in pairs of three in 
four different specifications. These include: UK Colony, Language fractionalization, Religious 
fractionalization, Orthodox, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Jewish, sub-Saharan Africa, 
Urbanization, European Language and Area. These variables are the same used by Berggren et al. 
(2008) and have been advanced as determinants of growth.  
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Details about variable definitions (with descriptive statistics) and correlation analysis 
(showing the relationships between key variables used in the paper) with presentation of 
countries are found in the appendices. The ‘summary statistics’ of the variables used in the 
regressions shows that there is quite some variation in the data utilized so that one should be 
confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge (Appendix 1). The purpose of the 
correlation matrix (Panel A of Appendix 2) is to address issues resulting from overparametization 
and multicolinearity. Based on a preliminary assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do 
not appear to be any serious concerns in terms of the relationships to be estimated.  Countries 
making-up the dataset are presented in Panel B of Appendix 2. 
 
2.2 Methodology  
2.2.1 Issue of outliers and robustness  
 It has been substantially documented that OLS estimates are sensitive to outliers 
(Berggren et al., 2008; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013a, b). This 
means observations that deviate from the linear pattern formed by the majority of the data. 
Outliers frequently occur in datasets because of measurement errors as some observations may be 
drawn from a different population with a different type of nexus between them and the variable 
of interest or due to exceptional events (e.g earthquakes). Accordingly, OLS on such a dataset 
contaminated by outliers may results in severely biased estimates. In the extreme case for 
instance, one single outlier can result in an infinite bias of OLS estimates. In order to deal with 
the problem, robust regression methods are required. As far as we have reviewed, quantile 
regressions are the most widely used regression methods that are robust to outliers.  
 Another issue in the trust-growth nexus literature that has been substantially debated is 
robustness (Berggren et al., 2008). In fact, the results may be fragile as the size of the estimated 
coefficient change with variation in control variables. This issue is addressed in this study by 
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using four different sets of switching control variables that control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity and hence, assess the sensitivity of the trust-growth nexus to changes in socio-
economic and cultural environments documented in recent literature (Uslaner, 2008; Tabellini, 
2008; Algan & Cahuc 2010; Cahuc, 2013: Kodila-Tedika & Agbor, 2013).  
 
2.2.2 Estimation technique  
 
Consistent with recent literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 
2013a, b), to determine whether existing levels of per capita economic prosperity affect how trust 
comes into play, we use quantile regression. This approach enables us to assess if the nexus 
between trust and growth differs throughout the distributions of growth (Koenker & Hallock, 
2001). Hence, based on this estimation technique we are able to carefully examine the incidence 
of trust throughout the conditional distribution with particular emphasis on countries with the 
highest and lowest growth levels. Quantile regression (hence QR) yields parameters estimated at 
multiple points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker & Bassett, 
1978).  Accordingly, the  th quantile estimator of the endogenous variable is obtained by 
solving for the following optimization problem. 
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Where   is in the ‘0 and 1’ interval. Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For example 
the 10
th
 or 75
th
 quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately weighing the 
residuals. The conditional quantile of iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                      (2) 
where unique slope parameters are derived for each  th quantile of interest. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at the 
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mean of the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable. For the model in Eq. (2) the 
dependent variable iy  is the GDP per capita growth rate while ix  contains a constant term, trust 
and control variables. Consistent with Berggren et al. (2008) we also provide a baseline 
estimation of mean effects. The employment of four sets of switch variables in different 
specifications for further robustness is consistent with recent quantile regression literature 
(Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013a).  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
The results presented in Tables 2 include OLS and QR estimates. OLS estimates provide 
a baseline of mean effects and we compare these to estimates of separate quantiles in the 
conditional distributions of the growth dependent variable. In the interpretation of estimated 
coefficients, it is worth noting that smaller values (in conditional distributions) of the dependent 
variables denote less growth.  
 Table 1 below summarizes the trust-growth effects of Table 2. The motivation for this 
summary is to synthesize the potential incidence of trust on growth when initial growth levels 
matter. Based on the summary of the results, two main conclusions could be drawn. Firstly, the 
substantially documented positive trust-growth nexus is broadly confirmed. Secondly, when 
initial levels of growth come into play in determining the relationship, only 0.25 and 0.90 
quantiles confirm the positive nexus. These findings are consistent across specifications.  
 Most of the significant control variables have the right signs. Firstly, the negative value of 
the initial growth coefficient confirms the presence of convergence in per capita income growth. 
This implies poorer countries (within full dataset and in some specific quantiles) are catching-up 
with their richer counterparts in terms of per capita income growth. Secondly, there is broadly a 
positive relationship between ‘investment-good price and growth’. This nexus is not significantly 
positive in Breggren et al. (2008) because of specification differences. Thirdly, the positive effect 
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of the Hindu dummy on growth in low income countries is broadly driven by the recent economic 
success of India in the sample.  
 While the emergence of a recent strand of interesting threshold literature on the trust-
growth nexus has focused on how initial levels of trust matter in the relationship (Uslaner, 2008; 
Tabellini, 2008; Roth, 2009; Algan & Cahuc, 2010), we have shown that initial levels of growth 
could also matter in this relationship. In fact the present study has complemented Breggren et al.  
(2008) by establishing that, while the trust-growth nexus is shaky, it is also conditional on initial 
growth levels. From the available weight of empirical evidence, the Roth (2009) hypothesis that 
cautions the generalization of the positive role of trust in economic performance is confirmed
2
. 
Hence, the trust benefits of economic growth could be contingent on initial levels of growth such 
that blanket trust-growth policies may not succeed unless they are tailored differently across low-
income and high-income countries.  
 
Table 1: Summary of results 
       
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
       
Specification 1 0.063*** 0.028 0.073* 0.034 0.038 0.082** 
 (0.002) (0.532) (0.078) (0.276) (0.168) (0.042) 
Specification 2 0.063*** 0.007 0.073** 0.036 0.045 0.060* 
 (0.001) (0.928) (0.033) (0.258) (0.264) (0.056) 
Specification 3 0.055*** 0.038 0.042* 0.032 0.069 0.094** 
 (0.006) (0.200) (0.097) (0.241) (0.288) (0.030) 
Specification 4 0.062*** 0.035 0.072* 0.040 0.054 0.099*** 
 (0.003) (0.477) (0.062) (0.155) (0.109) (0.003) 
       
*, **, ***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where GDP per capita 
growth is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 “The common knowledge which has governed the nature of discussions in social science and economics of the last 
ten years, that trust is generally positively related to economic performance, must be seriously questioned” (Roth, 
2009, p. 1).  
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Table 2: Conditional estimations  
        
  OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
  Specification 1 
   
Constant -0.294 0.231 0.245 0.007 1.478 0.969 
  (0.809) (0.912) (0.887) (0.996) (0.313) (0.685) 
Trust 0.063*** 0.028 0.073* 0.034 0.038 0.082** 
  (0.002) (0.532) (0.078) (0.276) (0.168) (0.042) 
 
 
 
Fixed Control 
Variables  
RGDP -0.159** 0.111 0.015 -0.080 -0.195** -0.284** 
 (0.026) (0.407) (0.886) (0.452) (0.047) (0.035) 
IGP 0.014 -0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.009 0.018 
 (0.153) (0.942) (0.927) (0.530) (0.607) (0.587) 
Schooling  0.111 -0.054 -0.238 0.120 0.134 0.248 
 (0.504) (0.809) (0.365) (0.648) (0.529) (0.377) 
Openness -0.002 -0.023 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.008 
 (0.728) (0.516) (0.859) (0.790) (0.920) (0.475) 
 
Switching 
Control 
Variables  
UK_Colony -0.094 1.691 0.719 -0.325 -0.273 0.798 
 (0.894) (0.393) (0.483) (0.773) (0.865) (0.454) 
LanguageF. -1.097 0.561 -1.800 0.390 -1.128 -2.910** 
 (0.301) (0.763) (0.423) (0.815) (0.562) (0.024) 
Religious F. 0.727 -3.468 0.416 0.005 1.920 0.663 
 (0.569) (0.318) (0.859) (0.998) (0.376) (0.811) 
        
Pseudo R² 0.249 0.282 0.163 0.078 0.151 0.411 
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
        
  OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
  Specification 2 
   
Constant -0.602 -2.921 -0.436 1.067 2.235 2.798* 
  (0.573) (0.361) (0.774) (0.469) (0.178) (0.067) 
Trust 0.063*** 0.007 0.073** 0.036 0.045 0.060* 
  (0.001) (0.928) (0.033) (0.258) (0.264) (0.056) 
 
 
 
Fixed Control 
Variables  
RGDP -0.191*** -0.157 -0.151 -0.093 -0.144* -0.249** 
 (0.005) (0.273) (0.203) (0.300) (0.085) (0.012) 
IGP 0.017* 0.026 0.011 0.010 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.071) (0.454) (0.275) (0.355) (0.724) (0.872) 
Schooling  0.205 0.543 0.221 0.018 0.060 0.251 
 (0.229) (0.189) (0.484) (0.943) (0.806) (0.425) 
Openness -0.003 -0.031 -0.033 -0.002 -0.0004 0.008 
 (0.627) (0.407) (0.307) (0.776) (0.971) (0.449) 
 
Switching 
Control 
Variables  
Orthodox -0.028* -0.031 -0.028 -0.034 -0.017 -0.031* 
 (0.057) (0.266) (0.345) (0.308) (0.363) (0.076) 
Muslims -0.005 0.007 -0.0001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.013 
 (0.567) (0.809) (0.989) (0.457) (0.611) (0.231) 
Buddhists 0.024 -0.005 -0.017 -0.014 0.101 0.027 
 (0.417) (0.853) (0.568) (0.675) (0.385) (0.824) 
        
Pseudo R² 0.296 0.312 0.170 0.090 0.219 0.403 
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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  OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
  Specification 3 
   
Constant -0.588 0.006 -0.959 -0.177 -0.211 0.717 
  (0.599) (0.996) (0.425) (0.909) (0.933) (0.865) 
Trust 0.055*** 0.038 0.042* 0.032 0.069 0.094** 
  (0.006) (0.200) (0.097) (0.241) (0.288) (0.030) 
 
 
 
Fixed Control 
Variables  
RGDP -0.170** 0.002 0.004 -0.147 -0.292* -0.300 
 (0.014) (0.977) (0.952) (0.246) (0.090) (0.272) 
IGP 0.019* 0.009 0.012 0.025 0.030 0.014 
 (0.055) (0.400) (0.216) (0.276) (0.370) (0.850) 
Schooling  0.143 -0.132 -0.148 0.040 0.208 0.125 
 (0.380) (0.522) (0.419) (0.866) (0.486) (0.625) 
Openness -0.002 -0.024 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.025 
 (0.772) (0.428) (0.530) (0.867) (0.743) (0.175) 
 
Switching 
Control 
Variables  
Hindus 0.019 0.038* 0.041*** 0.022 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.407) (0.066) (0.008) (0.321) (0.970) (0.437) 
Jews 0.300 0.513 0.381 0.669 0.668 0.771 
 (0.520) (0.146) (0.239) (0.452) (0.476) (0.517) 
SSA -1.292 -0.864 -1.339 -1.308 -1.553 -0.890 
 (0.200) (0.333) (0.212) (0.335) (0.615) (0.898) 
        
Pseudo R² 0.267 0.335 0.210 0.114 0.173 0.390 
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
        
  OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
  Specification 4 
   
Constant -1.397 -2.057 -2.011 -0.362 1.152 -0.552 
  (0.252) (0.436) (0.422) (0.827) (0.560) (0.797) 
Trust 0.062*** 0.035 0.072* 0.040 0.054 0.099*** 
  (0.003) (0.477) (0.062) (0.155) (0.109) (0.003) 
 
 
 
Fixed Control 
Variables  
RGDP -0.182*** -0.058 -0.081 -0.098 -0.185* -0.304*** 
 (0.007) (0.530) (0.462) (0.322) (0.075) (0.002) 
IGP 0.017* 0.019 0.012 0.017 0.011 0.019 
 (0.064) (0.199) (0.302) (0.180) (0.559) (0.342) 
Schooling  0.159 -0.002 -0.164 0.063 0.021 0.053 
 (0.334) (0.992) (0.506) (0.782) (0.930) (0.818) 
Openness 0.001 -0.021 -0.024 0.005 0.006 0.012 
 (0.889) (0.535) (0.568) (0.603) (0.563) (0.183) 
 
Switching 
Control 
Variables  
Urban -0.0003 0.010 0.037 -0.013 0.0008 0.019 
 (0.986) (0.741) (0.325) (0.613) (0.969) (0.354) 
EuroL 0.929 0.479 0.219 0.729 0.703 1.108 
 (0.1387) (0.590) (0.826) (0.413) (0.367) (0.147) 
Area -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.151) (0.177) (0.624) (0.401) (0.394) (0.466) 
        
Pseudo R² 0.302 0.328 0.189 0.117 0.179  
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
        
Notes.  The dependent variables is the GDP per capita growth rate.   *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations GDP per capita growth is least. P-values in brackets. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. RGDP: Real GDP 
per capita in 1996 constant prices (1990).  IGP: Investment Good Price. LanguageF: Language fractionalization. Religious F: 
Religious fractionalization. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. EuroL: European Language. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
The paper has extended Breggren et al. (2008) on ‘trust and growth: a shaky relationship” 
by incorporating recent developments in the trust-growth literature and using a robust 
methodological underpinning that accounts for the presence of outliers. The empirical evidence is 
based on 63 countries. Two main findings have been established. Firstly, the substantially 
documented positive trust-growth nexus is broadly confirmed. Secondly, when initial levels of 
growth come into play in determining the relationship, only 0.25 and 0.90 quantiles confirm the 
positive nexus. The results suggest that the trust-growth nexus cannot be generalized for all 
countries as some previous studies have concluded. Accordingly, blanket trust-growth policies 
may not succeed unless they are contingent in existing levels of development and tailored 
differently across rich and poor countries.  
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      Appendices 
 
Appendix 1:   Variable specifications and descriptive statistics (1990-2000)  
Variables Definitions    Obs Mean      S.D   Min        Max Sources 
 
Growth Annual growth rate in percent of real GDP (chain) per 63 1.751 1.934 -2.58 7.688 Heston et al. (2002) 
 
 capita, 1990-2000: 100*[(Real GDP per capita2000 /        
 Real GDP per capita1990)
1/10 − 1]       
 
    Trust 
Taiwan: 1990−1998 
63 30.46 15.71 5.000 66.10 
Inglehart et al. (2000); Zak and Knack (2001); Inglehart et al. (2004); 
Latinobarómetro (2004) 
 
First value of trust 1990−2000, i.e., the share that 
agrees with the statement “most people can be trusted” 
 
Schooling Average years of schooling, 1990 63 6.698 2.624 2.190 12.00 Barro and Lee (2001) 
 
Real GDP per Real GDP (chain) per capita, thousands of USD in 63 10.244 7.606 0.686 26.45 Heston et al. (2002) 
 
capita 1996 constant prices, 1990       
 
Investment-good The PPP of investment divided by the exchange rate 63 78.960 33.50 12.46 177.6 Heston et al. (2002) 
 
price times 100, 1990       
 
Openness Exports plus imports divided by real GDP per capita, 63 57.362 28.98 14.99 154.65 Heston et al. (2002) 
 
 in current prices, 1990       
 
UK colony 
Dummy with value 1 if former UK colony and 0 
otherwise 63 0.190 0.395 0.000 1.000 Persson and Tabellini (2003); http://www.britishempire.co.uk; 
 
       
Encyclopaedia Britannica; Nationalencyklopedin [Swedish National 
Encyclopedia] 
 
Language One minus the Herfindal index of linguistic group 62 0.269 0.257 0.002 0.922 Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
fractionalization shares, 2001       
 
Religious One minus the Herfindal index of religious group 63 0.390 0.232 0.004 0.860 Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
fractionalization shares, 2001       
 
Orthodox Share of population that is Orthodox Christian, 2000 63 3.881 15.96 0.000 93.76 
World Christian Database, 
http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/; 
 
       population from Heston et al. (2002), for Taiwan from 
 
       http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html 
 
Muslim Share of population that is Muslim, 2000 63 11.52 28.03 0.000 98.11 Ditto 
 
Buddhist Share of population that is Buddhist, 2000 63 1.888 7.711 0.000 55.72 Ditto 
 
Hindu Share of population that is Hindu, 2000 63 1.703 10.14 0.000 79.76 Ditto 
 
Jewish Share of population that is Jewish, 2000 62 0.259 0.546 0.000 3.065 Ditto 
 
Sub-Sahara 
Dummy with value 1 if African country is located to 
the south of the Sahara and 0 otherwise 63 0.063 0.245 0.000 1.000  
 
   Urban Share of population in urban areas, 1990       62 60.65 19.10 11.2 96.40 United Nations (2003) 
 
   European Fraction of a country's population that speaks English,      63 0.401 0.433 0.00 1.00 Hall and Jones (1999); http://www.ethnologue.com 
 
   Language French, German, Portuguese or Spanish       
 
   Area Million square kilometres       63 1.18 2.40 0.00 10.0 Central Intelligence Agency (2004) 
 
Obs: Observations. S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix and Presentation of Countries 
                   
Panel A: Correlation Matrix 
                   
Educ.  RGDP IGP Open UKcol Lanfrac Relifrac Ortho Muslim Budd. Hindu Jewish SSA Urban EuroL Area Trust  Growth  
1.000 0.789 0.276 0.216 -0.155 -0.205 0.307 0.146 -0.457 0.163 -0.188 0.271 -0.291 0.640 0.049 0.099 0.537 0.045 Educ. 
 1.000 0.604 0.169 -0.147 -0.167 0.279 -0.035 -0.326 0.186 -0.168 0.252 -0245 0.603 0.135 0.116 0.624 0.008 RGDP 
  1.000 0.067 0.110 -0.125 0.035 -0.041 0.012 0.132 -0.127 -0.002 0.022 0.233 0.013 -0.058 0.479 0.184 IGP 
   1.000 -0.026 -0.064 -0.144 -0.047 -0.021 -0.121 -0.210 -0.211 -0.161 0.198 -0.097 -0.397 0.088 -0.059 Open 
    1.000 0.380 0.316 -0.061 0.272 -0.089 0.268 -0.040 0.536 -0.274 -0.113 0.183 0.032 0.064 UKcol 
     1.000 0.323 -0.110 0.102 -0.108 0.283 -0.086 0.471 -0.394 -0.310 0.070 -0.091 -0.126 Lanfrac 
      1.000 -0.139 -0.336 0.208 -0.035 0.154 0.414 0.055 0.076 0.339 0.182 0.014 Relifrac 
       1.000 -0.031 -0.058 -0.038 -0.052 -0.062 -0.026 -0.188 -0.067 0.041 -0.158 Ortho 
        1.000 -0.086 0.072 -0.152 -0.041 -0.317 -0.339 -0.030 -0.110 -0.010 Muslim 
         1.000 -0.025 -0.084 -0.063 0.016 -0.184 0.014 0.180 0.161 Budd. 
          1.000 -0.066 -0.020 -0.292 -0.142 0.109 0.031 0.157 Hindu 
           1.000 -0.062 0.387 0.390 0.396 0.121 0.035 Jewish 
            1.000 -0.405 -0.218 -0.071 -0.213 -0.147 SSA 
             1.000 0.426 0.068 0.189 -0.027 Urban 
              1.000 0.221 -0.177 0.049 EuroL. 
               1.000 0.206 0.244 Area 
                1.000 0.346 Trust 
                 1.000 Growth 
                   
Panel B: Presentation of Countries (63) 
                   
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia,  Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan,  Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,  Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Uganda, United 
Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
                   
Educ: Schooling. RGDP: Real GDP per capita in 1996 constant prices (1990).  IGP: Investment Good Price. Open: Openness.  UKcol: UK Colony. Lanfrac: Language fractionalization. Relifrac: Religious 
fractionalization. Ortho: Orthodox. Budd: Buddhist. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. EuroL: European Language.  
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